Skip to content
Skip to content
CYBERSECURITY

When the security vendor is the way in, cybersecurity marketing is the advisory

On 22 September 2026, Check Point said two of its own products had been exploited, one of them as a zero-day first seen in July. What a vendor says next is the campaign.

Summarise with
Set as preferred source on Google
18 min read
Quick answerCybersecurity marketing is tested hardest when your own product is exploited: buyers judge disclosure speed, candour and advisory clarity, so build the policy, security.txt, templates and CSAF files before you need them.
Section 01

What Check Point disclosed about its zero-day vulnerability

On 22 September 2026, Check Point published an advisory that no security vendor ever wants to write: two of its own products were being used as a way in. For anyone running cybersecurity marketing at a vendor, the week that followed is a live case study in the only campaign that cannot be bought, the one written by how you disclose. Check Point said in its advisory that CVE-2026-93616 is a newly discovered zero-day vulnerability in Security Management, a pre-authentication path traversal in the management web service, and that a fix ships with the advisory itself.

The second flaw, CVE-2026-85102, sits in Security Gateway and Spark firewalls and turns on improper validation of certificate data during VPN negotiation. Check Point said a fix for it has been available since 9 September, and that starting on 12 September it observed a wave of exploitation attempts against Spark customers. The management flaw is the quieter and older story: the vendor said it saw a handful of pinpointed attacks on 23 July 2026, roughly two months before the patch arrived.

From first pinpointed attack to federal deadline
Timeline of the Check Point zero-day vulnerability disclosure, from the first attacks on 23 July 2026 to the CISA deadline on 25 September, a case study in cybersecurity marketing under pressure2026-07-23: First pinpointed attacks23 Jul 26First pinpointed attacks2026-09-09: VPN fix ships09 Sep 26VPN fix ships2026-09-12: Spark attempts12 Sep 26Spark attempts2026-09-22: Advisory and KEV22 Sep 26Advisory and KEV2026-09-25: Federal deadline25 Sep 26Federal deadline
Timeline of the Check Point zero-day vulnerability disclosure, from the first attacks on 23 July 2026 to the CISA deadline on 25 September, a case study in cybersecurity marketing under pressure
ItemValue
2026-07-23First pinpointed attacks
2026-09-09VPN fix ships
2026-09-12Spark attempts
2026-09-22Advisory and KEV
2026-09-25Federal deadline
Sixty-one days separate the first pinpointed attacks Check Point observed from the patch for the management flaw; the VPN fix, the exploitation wave and the EU reporting clock all landed inside one September fortnight.

Coverage moved fast and stayed measured. The Hacker News described the management flaw as one that lets an attacker who can reach the server's web service run scripts on it without logging in, and listed the affected release trains back through R80. SecurityWeek reported the vendor's own framing of a handful of customers who have been attacked, and said both flaws had joined CISA's catalogue of exploited bugs. The catalogue itself is the better witness here, and it is worth reading directly rather than through anyone's headline.

CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities feed lists both CVEs with a dateAdded of 2026-09-22 and a federal due date of 2026-09-25, a three-day window, with forensic triage flagged as required. (SecurityWeek dated the addition 23 September; the feed says the 22nd, and the feed wins.) The record for CVE-2026-93616 at the National Vulnerability Database carries a CVSS 3.1 base score of 9.8, network reachable, low complexity, no privileges, no user interaction, and a CISA coordinator assessment of exploitation active, automatable yes, technical impact total.

Keep the two kinds of number apart. What was measured: two CVEs, both scored 9.8, both listed as exploited by a federal agency on the same day. What the vendor described: a handful of targeted intrusions in July, and a wave of attempts in September. Nobody outside Check Point has published a count of victims, and this piece does not guess at one. That line between measured incidence and vendor account is exactly the line a careful buyer draws, which is why it belongs at the centre of your own playbook too.

Section 02

Why cybersecurity marketing is judged on disclosure

Most cybersecurity marketing sells a promise about somebody else's failure: the breach you will not suffer, the attacker you will outfox. A zero-day vulnerability in the vendor's own product flips that script in a single afternoon. The product is now part of the threat, and every claim on the website is quietly re-read against one question: when this company's own software was the way in, did it tell us straight, and did it tell us fast?

There is evidence that markets care. In an event study summarised by Harvard’s Berkman Klein cybersecurity wiki, Rahul Telang and Sunil Wattal found that on average a vendor loses around 0.6% of its stock value when a vulnerability is reported. That is an old paper on a different market, so treat it as a direction rather than a forecast. The mechanism it points to still holds: disclosure is priced, and the price depends on whether buyers believe the vendor saw it first.

Buyers of security products are unusually well equipped to judge. They read advisories for a living. They know what a pre-authentication path traversal means, they will check the NVD record, and they will notice if a CVSS score is softened or a release train is missing from the affected list. In most categories, marketing can smooth a rough week. In this one, the reader is the auditor, and smoothing reads as hiding.

Exploited bugs CISA added to its catalogue each month, 2026
Exploited bugs CISA added to its catalogue each month, 2026Line chart of monthly additions to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue from January to August 2026403020100JanFebMarAprMayJunJulAugKEV additions: 17KEV additions: 28KEV additions: 26KEV additions: 31KEV additions: 21KEV additions: 23KEV additions: 26KEV additions: 31
KEV additions
Line chart of monthly additions to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue from January to August 2026
ItemValue
KEV additions17
KEV additions28
KEV additions26
KEV additions31
KEV additions21
KEV additions23
KEV additions26
KEV additions31
CISA added between 17 and 31 exploited vulnerabilities a month through August 2026, so any vendor should plan for the week its own product joins that list.

That chart is the base rate every vendor should sit with. The KEV feed holds 237 entries added in 2026 up to 22 September, from a catalogue of 1,721. An exploited flaw in a security product is not a black swan; it is a scheduled weather event whose date nobody knows. So the marketing question is simple: is the den ready when the weather turns?

This is where the latest zero-day vulnerability becomes a brand event rather than an engineering ticket. The advisory is read by customers, by analysts, by journalists and by competitors' sales teams, often in that order. Its tone, its dates and its admissions become quotable within hours, and they stay quotable for years. Treat it as the most important piece of cybersecurity marketing you will publish that year, because it is.

Section 03

Reading the advisory: what the latest zero-day vulnerability teaches

Read the Check Point advisory as a document rather than a drama and a template emerges. It names both CVEs in the headline. It gives each a severity, a product list and version ranges. It says plainly which flaw is a zero-day, which fix was already available, and when exploitation was first observed. It tells customers to install fixes immediately and points to two support articles for detail. Whatever one thinks of the two-month gap, the page itself is clear, and clarity is the first thing buyers score.

Now look at what the record adds around it. The NVD entry shows CVE-2026-93616 published on 22 September with the vendor as the source of the CVSS vector, and the weakness mapped to CWE-22. That matters beyond the pedants. CISA's Secure by Design pledge asks signatories to include accurate CWE and CPE fields in every CVE record and to issue CVEs promptly for critical flaws or those showing evidence of active exploitation. A vendor that files complete records is doing brand work in a format machines can read.

Vendors with the most exploited bugs listed in 2026
Microsoft
38
Cisco
17
Apple
8
Google
8
Linux
8
Fortinet
7
Ivanti
5
Check Point
4
Check Point has four exploited flaws listed in 2026 against Microsoft's 38, so the gap buyers judge is how each vendor talks, not whether it ever appears.

The ranking is a useful corrective to panic. The same KEV catalogue shows Check Point with four entries added this year: the two from this week, a SmartConsole authentication flaw added on 22 July, and an IKEv1 gateway flaw added on 8 June. Larger vendors sit far higher. Appearing on the list is common. Appearing on it with a muddled advisory, a late CVE or a silent status page is the part that is optional, and the part cybersecurity marketing can actually influence.

The other external clock is the researcher's. Google's Project Zero disclosure policy gives vendors 90 days to ship a patch, and when a bug is exploited in the wild a 7-day policy replaces the 90-day one. Put simply, when attackers already have the quarry, the research community expects the vendor to speak within a week. Your advisory process has to run at that speed without a scramble, which means the words are drafted before the bug exists.

Two of our earlier pieces sit neatly beside this one. The Entra ID retraction story shows what happens when the word exploited is published and then withdrawn, and the exploited-issue communication test walks through how a patch-day message lands with customers who are already busy.

Section 04

Vulnerability disclosure now runs on a regulated clock

Vulnerability disclosure is now regulated in the European Union, which moves this conversation from nice-to-have to calendar. The European Commission’s CRA reporting page says that as of 11 September 2026 manufacturers must report actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents affecting products with digital elements. The clock is strict: an early warning within 24 hours of becoming aware, a notification within 72 hours, and a final report no later than 14 days after a corrective measure is available.

Those reports go once, through a single reporting platform run by ENISA with the CSIRT network. That does not make every advisory public on day one, and nobody should market the obligation as a badge. What it does is force a vendor to know, in writing and within a day, what it knows. We covered the mechanics in what actually opened on 11 September and the marketing angle in the 24-hour credibility test; the short version is that the regulator has set the pace your comms must keep.

Federal buyers in the United States add their own pressure. CISA's BOD 26-04 directive ties agency remediation to risk, and for a publicly exposed, known exploited, automatable flaw with total impact the window in Table 1 is three days plus forensic triage. Both Check Point entries carry that flag. The vendor's advisory therefore does not just inform customers; it becomes the working document for thousands of agency tickets due by 25 September.

For a vendor, this is the argument for a real vulnerability disclosure programme rather than a contact form. Our LG Uplus programme piece shows the shape a public one can take. The minimum is a published policy that authorises good-faith testing, a machine-readable way to reach you, and an advisory format that customers and their tools can parse without a phone call.

Section 05

Build the disclosure kit before the bad week

Trust built after a zero-day vulnerability is borrowed; trust built before one is banked. The practical cybersecurity marketing kit is small and mostly free, and every piece of it doubles as content a buyer can inspect on a quiet Tuesday long before anything goes wrong. Think of it as marking the trail before the moonlit walk rather than during it.

cybersecurity marketing as disclosure: the vixen listens beside a hooded lantern before lifting its shutter
Disclosure is a lantern you open on purpose, before someone else opens it for you.

Start with the front door. RFC 9116 defines security.txt, a small file that organisations must place under the /.well-known/ path, with a Contact field and an Expires field that must always be present. It takes ten minutes, it tells researchers where to go, and a stale Expires date is one of the first things a sceptical buyer's team will spot. Link it from a public disclosure policy that says what you will and will not pursue.

Then make advisories machine-readable. CSAF 2.0, approved as an OASIS Standard on 18 November 2022, is a JSON format for security advisories, and its VEX profile lets a supplier state whether a product is affected by a given vulnerability. CISA's SBOM and VEX guidance describes a VEX document as an attestation, a form of security advisory. For the marketing team, that means your not-affected statements can land in customers' tooling automatically, which is the calmest message you will ever send.

  • 24h

    CRA early warning after becoming aware

  • 72h

    CRA vulnerability notification

  • 7 days

    Project Zero window for in-the-wild bugs

  • 9.8

    CVSS score on both Check Point flaws

Third, a status and advisory hub with a stable address. One page lists every advisory, its CVEs, its first-published and last-updated dates, and a changelog for revisions. When facts change, you edit the advisory and log the edit, rather than publishing a new post that contradicts the old one. Buyers forgive a revision far more easily than a silent rewrite.

Fourth, templates. Write the advisory skeleton now, with blanks for CVE, CVSS, affected versions, first observed exploitation, fix availability and customer action. Sign off the voice with legal in advance, so the day-one argument is about facts, not adjectives. The cards below are a starting point your team can paste into its own documents.

01

Advisory headline

First line of any exploited-flaw advisory · 5 minutes

[Action required]: active exploitation of [CVE-ID] in [product]
Severity: CVSS [score], [vector]
First exploitation observed: [date], [scope in plain words]
Fix: available [date], [where]
What to do now: [one sentence]
02

Customer email opener

Sent within hours of the advisory · 10 minutes

We have confirmed [exploitation / exploitation attempts] of [CVE-ID] in [product].
Here is what we know, what we do not yet know, and what we are asking you to do today.
We will update this advisory at [time] and log every change at [URL].
03

Not-affected statement

For products outside the affected list · 5 minutes

[Product] is not affected by [CVE-ID] because [component] is not present / not reachable.
This statement is also published as a CSAF VEX document at [URL].

None of this needs a large budget, but it does need an owner. The content marketing side writes the templates and runs the hub; the brand strategy side decides the voice for the worst day of the year before it arrives. Both belong in the cybersecurity marketing plan, not in an incident runbook nobody in marketing has read.

Section 06

The habits behind cybersecurity marketing buyers trust

Cybersecurity marketing that survives an incident is built from habits, not heroics. The vendors buyers trust on a bad week are the ones who published their disclosure policy, kept security.txt current, shipped machine-readable advisories and wrote the difficult email in draft months earlier. On the day, they fill in blanks. Everyone else writes from scratch while the phones ring.

Language matters as much as speed. The house rule we apply in our interactive story on reported but unconfirmed claims fits here: attribute, date and scope everything. Say what you observed and when. Say what you do not yet know. Avoid adjectives that promise, such as fully contained or no customer impact, unless you can prove them in the advisory itself. In a thicket of speculation, the plain sentence is the one that gets quoted.

For one week a year, your advisory is the most read page you own. Write it before you need it.
folkfox, on disclosure as cybersecurity marketing

Measure it, too. Track time from first observed exploitation to public advisory, time from advisory to CVE publication, and the share of advisories that ship with a CSAF file. None of these is a vanity metric, and all of them can appear on a trust page with dates attached. Buyers comparing shortlists will notice a vendor that shows its homework.

Check Point's week will be argued about for a while, mostly over the gap between 23 July and 22 September. The advisory, the KEV entries and the NVD record are all public, and readers can form their own view. For every other vendor, the useful question is closer to home: if the next entry in that feed carries your name, is the lantern already trimmed, or will you be hunting for matches in the dark? If you want a second pair of eyes on the plan, talk to us.

Questions

Frequently asked questions

What is a zero-day vulnerability?

A zero-day vulnerability is a flaw that attackers can exploit before the vendor has shipped a fix, so defenders have had zero days to patch. Check Point's CVE-2026-93616 is an example: the vendor said it observed a handful of pinpointed attacks on 23 July 2026, and the fix arrived with its advisory on 22 September.

What is the latest zero-day vulnerability in Check Point products?

CVE-2026-93616, a pre-authentication path traversal in the Security Management web service, scored 9.8 in the NVD. Check Point disclosed and fixed it on 22 September 2026, and CISA listed it as known exploited the same day with a federal due date of 25 September.

How should a security vendor talk about its own vulnerability?

Attribute and date everything, separate what you observed from what you suspect, name the CVE, severity, affected versions and fix, and tell customers exactly what to do today. Update the same advisory with a changelog rather than publishing contradicting posts. Avoid reassuring adjectives you cannot prove on the page.

Does the Cyber Resilience Act change vulnerability disclosure?

Yes. Since 11 September 2026, manufacturers of products with digital elements must report actively exploited vulnerabilities through ENISA's single reporting platform: an early warning within 24 hours, a notification within 72 hours, and a final report within 14 days of a fix being available. That reporting is to authorities, not a public advisory.

What is security.txt and do we need one?

security.txt is a small text file defined in RFC 9116, placed at /.well-known/security.txt, that tells researchers how to report a flaw. It must contain a Contact field and an Expires field. It costs minutes to publish, and buyers' security teams often check it first.

Where does cybersecurity marketing fit in incident response?

Marketing owns the words customers read: the advisory page, the email, the status hub and the trust page. It should draft templates and agree the voice with legal in advance, so on the day the team fills in verified facts rather than arguing about adjectives while the clock runs.

Keep reading

Read more on this topic

Want your disclosure story written before the bad week?

We help security vendors build the policy, templates and advisory hub that make a hard day read as competence, and turn that record into cybersecurity marketing buyers can check.

Want folkfox in your Google results and AI answers? Set folkfox as a preferred source.

The den

Where to?

Pricing

Choose a section. Enter opens it, Escape continues reading.

Cookie preferences

folkfox uses data the way we use strategy: only when it earns its place.